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STRESS CLAIMS UNDER THE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT OF MARYLAND 
Lauren A. Sfekas 
In Maryland, as in many states, I the legislature has 
enacted a comprehensive set of workers' compensation 
laws designed to provide monetary benefits and neces-
sary medical care to employees who suffer work-related 
injuries.2 Under the Maryland statute, an injured work-
er is entitled to compensation if he sustains an acciden-
tal personal injury.3 The statute defines an accidental 
personal injury as "an accidental injury that arises out 
of and in the course of employment."4 Case law has 
further defined the term "accidental injury" to include 
only those injuries which result from "some unusual 
strain, exertion, or condition of employment."5 
The Maryland Workers' Compensation statute pro-
vides benefits not only for accidental injuries, but also 
for occupational diseases.6 The courts have defined an 
occupational disease as. "some ailment, disorder, or 
illness which is the expectable result of working under 
conditions naturally iriherent in the employment and 
inseparable therefrom, and is ordinarily slow and insid-
ious in its approach."? To recover, a claimant must 
suffer a disability which is "due to the nature of an 
employment in which hazards of the occupational dis-
ease exist."8 
The law is well settled that a physical injury which 
results from an accidental injury or occupational disease 
is compensable.9 Recently, an increasing number of 
workers have filed claims seeking compensation for 
stress-related mental injuries. Claims for mental stress 
have increased faster than any other type of claim for 
workers' compensation. lo Because these cases provide 
difficult causation issues due to the vague nature of 
stress and the realization that emotional illness is often 
caused by co-existing factors, II the courts have strug-
gled to provide an objective framework for determining 
the compensability of the increasing number of claims 
for stress-related injuries. 
There are many different types of mental stress 
claims. The claims have developed primarily into three 
categories --physical-mental claims, in which a physical 
traumaresuits inamentai injury; mental-physical claims, 
in which a mental stimulus results in a physical injury; 
and mental-mental claims, in which a mental stimulus 
causes mental injuries. 
The purpose ofthis article is to examine the current 
treatment of stress claims in Maryland, particularly in 
light of the recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, 
Inc. 12 and Davis v. Dyncorp.13 
I. Physical-Mental Claims 
A physical-mental claim arises when a physical 
injury results in a mental condition. For example, a 
worker may sustain a physical injury in an accident. The 
physical injury then causes the worker to suffer anxiety 
which prolongs or increases the disability. Across the 
country, claims of this nature are found to be totally 
compensable, including the effects of the emotional 
disability.14 Courts have long recognized that the 
physical injury itself helps to establish the validity of the 
mental injury and its causal connection to the accident. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the 
compensability of physical-mental claims as early as 
1924 in Bramble v. Shields. IS In Bramble, the claimant 
suffered a physical injury and thereafter became con-
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vinced that his backbone was decaying. 16 This delusion 
caused him to be permanently disabled. The doctors 
indicated that his psychological condition was related to 
the stress which resulted from the accident. 17 The court 
of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, finding that the 
claimant's mental disorder was compensab Ie because it 
was causally related to the original accidental injury at 
work. 18 Claims of this nature are also compensable even 
if the claimant suffered from a pre-existing mental 
illness, provided the illness was aggravated by the 
physical injury sustained at work. 
II. Mental-Physical Claims 
A mental-physical claim occurs when a claimant 
suffers a physical injury or illness that results from a 
mental occurrence. For instance, a 
through a small opening.29 Sargent, who suffered from 
claustrophobia, blacked out immediately upon entering 
the boiler.30 Initially, the court noted that the cleaning 
of the boilers was an unusual condition even though it 
was included in her overall job description.31 The 
employer, however, contended that the injury was still 
not compensable because it arose from the mental 
condition of claustrophobia and was not accompanied 
by physical injury. After noting that Sargent blacked 
out for several hours, the court concluded that this was 
a sufficient physical reaction to qualify as an accidental 
injury.32 
In Maryland, it is clear that before a mental-
physical claim can be classified as a compensable acci-
dental injury, it must meet the statutory definition of 
accidental injury. The mental stim-
claimant may witness a shocking 
event which causes him to have a 
heart attack. Maryland, I 9 as well as 
all other states,2° has consistently 
ruled that claims of this nature are 
compensable. Some states require 
that the mental stimulus be sud-
den.21 Others allow compensation 
even ifthe mental stimulus is grad-
ual and a sudden, specific event 
cannot be pinpointed. 22 Causal con-
nection, of course, is more readily 
In Maryland, it is clear 
that before a mental-
physical claim can be 
ulus must be unusual and extraor-
dinary to be compensable. Phys-
iological injuries which result from 
the ordinary stresses of life, or 
from gradual stress which cannot 
be classified as unusual, are not 
compensable in Maryland.33 In 
Whiting- Turner Contracting Co: 
v. McLaughlin,34 the court de-
nied coverage for a claimant who 
suffered a stroke foHowing an 
classified as a 
compensable acciden-
tal injury, it must meet 
the statutory definition 
of accidental injury. 
established when the physical injury 
immediately follows the sudden mental stimulus. 
The most notable mental-physical case in Maryland is J. 
Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett. 23 In Geipe, the claimant, 
a truck driver, accidentally ran over another man. As a 
result, Geipe developed immediate paralysis, had to be 
removed from his truck, and was taken to the hospital. 
It was subsequently discovered that he had suffered a 
cerebral hemorrhage.24 The court found that the cere-
bral hemQrrhage and the resulting paralysis suffered by 
Geipe were physical in nature,25 and specifically stated 
that an accidental personal injury results if there is a 
nervous shock that produces a physiological injury.26 
The compensability of mental-physical claims was 
reaffirmed in Sargent v. Board of Education of Balti-
more County.27 Sargent was employed by the Board of 
Education as a custodian. Part of her job description 
required that she clean boilers once a year. 28 The boilers 
were very dark and sooty and it was necessary to enter 
the boiler by laying horizontally on a board which slid 
argument at work. The court 
explained that before a claim for 
stress can be compensable, it must amount to more than 
the stress encountered in the average daily life.35 
Although a physical injury caused by gradual mental 
stress would not be compensable as an accidental injury, 
it may be compensable as an occupational disease, 
provided the claimant can show that the disability is 
"due to the nature of the employment in which the 
hazards ofthe occupational disease exist."36 This issue, 
however, has never been definitively decided in Mary-
land. 
III. Mental-Mental Claims 
In all of the above categories, the law is relatively 
settled. A much greater controversy, however, has 
arisen over "mental-mental claims." A claim of this 
nature arises when a mental stimulus results in a mental 
or psychological injury. The issue of causation is much 
more difficult in this type of claim because there is no 
physical force which precisely establishes either the 
cause or the extent ofthe injury. The emerging trend, 
however, is to allow recovery in such cases.37 
In states that allow recovery for mental-mental 
claims, some hold that such claims are compensable 
only if there is a specific traumatic stimulus.38 Other 
states allow compensation for injuries which result from 
gradual stress.39 
For a mental-mental claim to be compensable in 
Maryland as an accidental injury, the claimant must 
show that the stress encountered was "unusual. "40 As 
previously discussed, a claim for mental stress as an 
occupational disease will be allowed only if the claimant 
can show that the mental injury is due to the nature of 
the employment in which the hazards of the occupation-
al disease exist.41 
In Belcher v. T Rowe Price Foundation, Inc. ,42 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland had its first opportunity 
to determine whether purely mental injuries, without 
any physical components, are compensable under the 
Workers' Compensation Act. In that case, Belcher was 
employed in downtown Baltimore by T. Rowe Price as 
a secretary. She was sitting at her desk when a three-
ton beam being hoisted by a construction crane came 
loose and crashed through the ceiling, landing five feet 
from her desk. 43 As a result of the traumatic incident, 
she suffered sleep disturbance, nightmares, heart palpi-
tations, chest pains, and headaches. She developed 
serious emotional problems and came under the care of 
a psychiatrist who diagnosed her as suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder. 44 Unlike the claimants in 
Geipe and Sargent, Belcher never received treatment 
for any physical complaints.45 Her claim for benefits 
was denied by the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion.46 
In its analysis, the Belcher court sought to deter-
mine whether the phrase "accidental personal injury" 
encompasses "mental" injuries. Because the Workers' 
Compensation Act does not define the term "injury," 
the court reviewed the case law defining "accidental 
personal injury" as used in the Workers' Compensation 
Act, but found no definitive answer.47 Therefore, the 
court turned to tort cases for guidance. 
The court found that "physical injury" as defined by 
case law includes "demonstrable emotional distress"48 
and that damages may be recovered for emotional 
distress capable of objective determination.49 The 
Belcher court stressed, however, that the harm must be 
capable of objective determination so as to provide 
assurance that a claim is not spurious. 50 Where the harm 
is capable of objective determination and the mental 
distress appears to be real, no good reason can be found 
for denying recovery. 51 
After examining Maryland tort law, the court re-
viewed the philosophy of the Workers' Compensation 
Act, which is to provide financial support and medical 
benefits to victims of work-related accidents. 52 The 
court noted that the inability to work and the loss of 
earnings are the same whether pursued under the Act or 
by way of damages in a tort action. Consequently, the 
court concluded that the concept of "physical injury" 
adopted in determining damages in torts cases should 
also apply to the concept of "personal injury" in 
awarding benefits in workers' compensation claims53 
and that the recovery allowed under the Workers' 
Compensation Act should be similar to the recovery 
allowed in torts. The court stated that "[t]he provisions 
ofthe Act do not prohibit it; expediency has not proved 
to be a deterrent; the advances in medical science make 
it feasible; logic supports it; the needs of society require 
it. "54 
After concluding that claims from mental injury are 
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, 
the Belcher court cautioned that merely showing that a 
mental injury was related to general conditions of 
employment or incidents occurring over an extended 
period of time is not enough to entitle the claimant to 
compensation. 55 The mental inj ury must be precipitated 
by an event that is unexpected and unforeseen. 
Consistent with the accidental injury requirement of 
Article 101,56 the Belcher court rejected the notion that 
mental injury caused by gradual stress is compensable 
as an accidental injury. However, the Belcher court left 
open whether a claim for injuries caused by gradual 
stress is compensable as an occupational disease. 
Recently, in Davis v. Dynacorp,57 the court of 
appeals was called upon to address the compensability 
of a mental-mental claim as an occupational disease. In 
Davis, the claimant sought compensation for a mental 
disease which resulted from on-the-job harassment.58 
The claimant alleged that as a result of the harassment, 
he experienced restlessness, sleeping problems, head-
aches, and developed post-traumatic stress syndrome, 
all of which prevented him from returning to work. 59 
The claimant asserted that he was entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits because he had suffered a dis-
abling occupational disease.6o 
Initially, the court of appeals addressed the issue of 
whether Belcher precluded recovery as a matter oflaw 
for post-traumatic stress syndrome arising from harass-
ment by fellow employees. The court concluded that 
Belcher, which states that "a mere showing that a 
mental injury was related to general conditions of 
employment, or to incidents occurring over an extend-
ed period of time, does not entitle the claimant to 
compensation,"61 is specifically limited to accidental 
injury claims and is not controlling in connection with 
claims for occupational disease.62 Having concluded 
that Davis' claim was not prohibited by Belcher, the 
court went on to address whether Davis had shown that 
harassment was a hazard within the nature of his 
employment, as required by the Maryland Workers' 
Compensation Act. Davis was a computer operator and 
the court stated that harassment by fellow employees is 
not a hazard within the nature ofthe employment as a 
computer data operator. There was nothing peculiar to 
his activities that made him more susceptible to harass-
ment than employees in other types of employment.63 
Accordingly, because the mental disease caused by 
Davis' job harassment could not reasonably be charac-
terized as due to the general character of his employ-
ment, the court held that Davis did not suffer from a 
compensable occupational disease. 64 
In its opinion, the court expressly stated that it was 
not "willing to rule out the possibility that some grad-
ually resulting, purely mental diseases could be 
compensable occupational diseases or that there may be 
circumstances where work-induced stress may result in 
a compensable occupational disease."65 By limiting its 
ruling to the issue of whether the harassment suffered by 
Davis was due to the nature of his specific employment, 
the court left open the question of whether mental stress 
would be compensable as an occupational disease if the 
claimant could show that it was due to the nature of 
employment in which the risk of stress exists. If the 
claimant were able to prove this requirement, it appears 
that the court of appeals would allow compensation for 
such a claim. 
Conclusion 
As stress in the workplace continues to increase, 
stress-related compensation claims will rise propor-
tionately. Maryland, as well as all other jurisdictions, 
has a long history of allowing recovery for mental stress 
claims, provided there is some physical component to 
the claim. If the stress results from a compensable 
physical trauma, or if a stressful incident results in a 
physiological reaction, recovery is routinely allowed. 
The compensability of purely mental claims, however, 
continues to generate controversy. With the decisions 
in Belcher v. T Rowe Price Foundation, Inc. andDavis 
v. Dynacorp, Maryland is clearly following the trend of 
allowing a worker to recover for mental stress even in 
the absence of any physical injury. 
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